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This paper presents the second part of the research activities carried out to develop a novel GNSS 
Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system for manned and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) applications.  The ABIA systems architecture was developed to allow real-time avoidance of 
safety-critical flight conditions and fast recovery of the required navigation performance in case of 
GNSS data losses.  In more detail, our novel ABIA system addresses all four cornerstones of GNSS 
integrity augmentation in mission- and safety-critical avionics applications: prediction (caution flags), 
avoidance (optimal flight path guidance), reaction (warning flags)  and correction (recovery flight 
path guidance).  Part 1 (Sabatini et al., 2012) presented the ABIA concept, architecture and key 
mathematical models used to describe GNSS integrity issues in aircraft applications.  This second part 
addresses the ABIA caution and warning integrity flags criteria and presents detailed results of a 
simulation case-study performed on the TORNADO-IDS aircraft.    
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1. INTRODUCTION.  In recent years, various strategies have been developed for increasing 
the levels of integrity of GNSS based navigation and landing systems.  In addition to Space 
Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), 
GNSS augmentation may also take the form of additional information being provided by 
other avionics systems. As the additional avionics systems operate via separate principles 
than the GNSS, they are not subject to the same sources of error or interference.  A system 
such as this is referred to as an Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS).  Unlike SBAS 
and GBAS technology, previous research on ABAS mainly concentrates on additional 
information being blended into the position calculation to increase accuracy and/or continuity 
of the integrated navigation solutions.  Additionally, no significant attempts have been made 
of developing ABAS architectures capable of generating integrity signals suitable for 
mission- and safety-critical GNSS applications (e.g., aircraft precision approach and landing) 
and no commercial ABAS products are available at present.  In our research, we developed 
an ABIA architecture specifically targeting GNSS integrity augmentation for manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) applications.  Although current and likely future 
SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can provide significant improvement of GNSS 
navigation performance, a properly designed and flight certified AIAS could play a key role 
in GNSS Augmentation for mission- and safety-critical applications such as aircraft precision 
approach, automatic landing and UAV Sense-and-Avoid (SAA).  Furthermore, using suitable 
data link and data processing technologies, a certified ABIA capability could be a core 
element of the future GNSS Space-Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN). 
   
2. INTEGRITY FLAG GENERATOR SIMULATION.  The ABIA Integrity Flag Generator 
(IFG) is designed to provide CIF and WIF alerts (i.e., in accordance with the specified TTC 
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and TTW requirements) in all relevant flight phases.  In order to evaluate the performance of 
the Masking, Multipath, Carrier-to-Noise (C/N0), Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) and Doppler 
analysis algorithms presented in part 1 (Sabatini et al., 2012), the IFG software was 
developed and tested in MATLAB, together with a detailed Aircraft (A/C) Three 
Dimensional (3D) Model in CATIA (Computer Aided Three-dimensional Interactive 
Application), a 3D Terrain and Objects Database, a GNSS Constellation Simulator and a 
Navigation/Flight Dynamics Simulator.  Fig. 1 shows the architecture adopted for the IFG 
module simulation.  Another key feature of the IFG module presented in this second paper is 
a pre-defined set of CIF and WIF thresholds applicable to the specific A/C dynamic 
conditions and satellite constellations observed during the flight.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  ABIA IFG module simulation. 
 
 A GNSS Constellation Simulator (GCS) was implemented to support GNSS satellite 
visibility, signal and geometry analysis.  It calculated GNSS satellite position and velocity in 
the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame and obtained satellite visibility data 
from any point along the A/C flight trajectory.  The GCS was developed in MATLAB to 
simulate GPS and GALILEO constellations.  However, the GCS was conceived as  a flexible 
tool capable to incorporate other current and likely future GNSS constellations (GLONASS, 
COMPASS, etc.), including space-based regional and global augmentation systems.  The 
satellite position and velocity were calculated from the Kepler's laws of orbital motion and, 
for the case of GPS satellites, using either the YUMA or SEM almanac data (Celestrak, 2012).  
An A/C Navigation/Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was also implemented to generate the 
nominal flight path trajectory and attitude (Euler) angles.  The ADS employed a classical 
Three Degrees of Freedom (3-DOF) point-and-variable mass model.  The assumptions are: 
 The Earth shape is approximated as an ellipsoid using WGS-84 parameters.  
 The atmosphere is considered at rest relatively to the Earth. 
3 
 
 A standard ISA atmospheric model is adopted to describe temperature, pressure and 
density variations as a function of altitude. 
 The A/C is modelled as a rigid body with a vertical plane of symmetry. 
 The A/C mass reduction in flight is due to fuel consumption only. 
 Thrust, aerodynamic forces and weight act on the A/C Centre of Gravity (CoG).   
 The flight is supposed to be symmetric (i.e., no sideslip). 
The 3-DOF scalar equations are the following: 
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where: 
   = A/C mass; 
     = Aerodynamic speed; 
   = Thrust magnitude; 
   =  Angle of attack; 
   =  Altitude; 
   =  Lift magnitude; 
   =  Drag, defined as a function of   ,   and  ; 
   =  Gravity acceleration; 
   =  Flight path angle; 
   =  Bank or roll angle; 
   =  Heading angle; 
   =  Specific fuel consumption, defined as a function of    and  ; 
   =  Geodetic latitude; 
   =  Geodetic longitude; 
   =  Meridional radius of curvature; 
    =  Transverse radius of curvature. 
 
This model presents seven state variables (             ) and three control variables 
(     )   Hence, for it to be solved, at least three flight constraints must be specified for each 
flight manoeuvre.  As described in part 1 (Sabatini et al., 2012), the ABIA IFG uses a set of 
predefined threshold parameters to trigger the generation of both caution and warning flags 
associated with antenna obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, direct carrier/interference and 
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satellite geometry degradations.  More details about the simulation process are provided in 
the following paragraphs with a special focus on the CIF and WIF threshold setting criteria 
incorporated into the ABIA IFG module design.    
 
3. INTEGRITY FLAG CRITERIA.  The philosophy adopted to set-up thresholds for the 
ABIA CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in Fig. 2.  Integrity flags are generated based 
on a dedicated error analysis addressing the following aspects of GNSS performance: 
 Satellite-A/C (receiver) relative geometry and position errors; 
 Radio frequency (RF) signal errors (i.e., Doppler shift, jamming and multipath); 
 Receiver Tracking Errors (RTE). 
 
CIF and WIF 
Thresholds
Relative 
Geometry 
Radio 
Frequency
Receiver 
Tracking
Antenna Masking
Position Accuracy 
PLL Tracking
FLL Tracking
Masking Matrixes
Estimated HPE/VPE
Rx Tracking Errors
DLL Tracking
Multipath
Link Budget
Interference
C/N0 Calculation
J/S Calculation
Doppler Shift
Phase/Range Errors
Frequency Error
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Integrity flag thresholds criteria. 
 
 In particular, the RTE models are used to support the development of robust criteria for 
the RF signal thresholds, in addition to the criteria based on experimental results (e.g., ground 
and flight test activities with GNSS).  In the following, we present the detailed criteria 
adopted for setting the various CIF and WIF thresholds. 
 
 3.1. Satellite-A/C Relative Geometry and Position Errors.  As described in (Sabatini et al., 
2012), in order to generate CIF/WIF associated to critical antenna masking conditions, a 
dedicated analysis is required taking into account the variation of the attitude angles.  
Therefore, using the CATIA 3D model of the A/C, series of Antenna Obscuration Matrixes 
(AOMs) are collected with pitch angles varying between -90 degree and 90 degree and with 
roll angles varying between -90 degree and 90 degree.  An example of the resulting Global 
Masking Profile (GMP) obtained for the TORNADO-IDS is shown in Fig. 3.  In this figure, 
also the GPS satellite constellation is shown (from the GCS module).  The obscuration 
integrity flag criteria are the following: 
  When the current A/C manoeuvre will lead to less the 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall 
be generated. 
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  When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be generated. 
Additionally, if only four satellites are in view: 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle (antenna frame) is less than 10 
degrees, the caution integrity flag shall be generated. 
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is less than 5 degrees, the warning 
integrity flag shall be generated. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  TORNADO-IDS global masking profile (B = bank and P = pitch - all values in degrees). 
 
Using the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP) factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed 
as (Kaplan and Hegarty, 2006): 
 
             (8) 
 
where    is the standard deviation of the positioning accuracy and       is  the standard 
deviation of the satellite pseudorange measurement error.  For the C/A-code       is in the 
order of 33.3m.  Therefore, the 1-σ Estimated Position, Horizontal and Vertical Errors of a 
GNSS receiver are calculated using the PDOP (Estimated Position Error - EPE), the HDOP 
(Estimated Horizontal Error - EHE) or the VDOP (Estimated Vertical Error - EVE) 
respectively.  In order to generate CIFs and WIFs that are consistent with current GNSS 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP), we need to introduce the Horizontal and Vertical 
Accuracy (HA/VA) requirements applicable to the different flight phases.  Table 1 shows the 
GNSS signal-in-space alert requirements in terms of HA/VA for En-route, Non-precision 
Approach (NPA) and for the three categories of Precision Approach.  Table 2 shows the 
GNSS signal-in-space protection requirements.  The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the 
radius of a circle in the horizontal plane, with its centre being at the true position, which 
describes the region which is required to contain the indicated horizontal position with the 
required probability for a particular navigation mode.  Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit 
(VAL) is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis, with its centre being at the true 
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position, which describes the region which is required to contain the indicated vertical 
position with the required probability for a particular navigation mode. 
 
Table 1.  GNSS signal-in-space alert requirements (ICAO, 2006). 
 
 
 
Table 2.  GNSS signal-in-space protection requirements (CAA, 2003). 
 
 
 
As a result of our discussion, the DOP integrity flags criteria are the following: 
  When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 95% alert requirements, the CIF shall 
be generated. 
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System (GLS) has to be augmented by GBAS in 
order to achieve the Required Navigation Performance (RNP), as well as Lateral and Vertical 
Protection Levels (LPL and VPL).  LPL/VPL is defined as the statistical error value that 
bounds the Lateral/Vertical Navigation System Error (NSE) with a specified level of 
Typical operation Accuracy horizontal 95% Accuracy vertical 95%
En-route 3.7 km N/A
En-route, Terminal 0.74km N/A
NPA 220m N/A
APV-I 16m 20m
APV-II 16m 8m
Category-I precision approach 16m 6m-4m
Category-II precision approach 6.9m 2m
Category-III precision approach 6.2m 2m
Typical operation Horizontal Alert Limit Vertical Alert Limit TTA
En-route 7.4 km N/A 5min
En-route (continental) 3.7km N/A 15s
En-route, Terminal 1.85 km N/A 10s
NPA 556m N/A 10s
APV-I 40m 50m 6s
APV-II 40m 20m 6s
Category-I precision approach 40m 15m-10m 6s
Category-II precision approach 17.3m 5.3m 1s
Category-III precision approach 15.5m 5.3m 1s
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confidence.  In particular, for the case of LAAS, which allows for multiple DGPS reference 
receivers (up to four) to be implemented, two different hypotheses are made regarding the 
presence of errors in the measurements.  These hypotheses are (RTCA, 2004): 
 H0 Hypothesis – No faults are present in the range measurements (includes both the 
signal and the receiver measurements) used in the ground station to compute the 
differential corrections. 
 H1 Hypothesis – A fault is present in one or more range measurements and is caused 
by one of the reference receivers used in the ground station.    
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as follows: 
 
                                     (9) 
 
                                      (10) 
 
The lateral and vertical accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits required by a GLS in the 
presence of LAAS, considering the continuously varying position of the A/C with respect to 
the Landing Threshold Point (LTP) are also given in (RTCA, 2004).  Additionally, this  
RTCA standard provides the so-called Continuity of Protection Levels in terms of Predicted 
Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels (PLPL and PVPL).  Although the definition in (RTCA, 
2004) is quite comprehensive, a generic statement is made that the PVPL and PLPL 
computations shall be based on the ranging sources expected to be available for the duration 
of the approach.  In other terms, it is implied that the airborne subsystem shall determine 
which ranging sources are expected to be available, including the ground subsystem’s 
declaration of satellite differential correction availability (satellite setting information). 
Unfortunately, this generic definition does not address the various conditions for satellite 
signal losses associated to specific A/C manoeuvres (including curved GLS precision 
approaches).  Therefore, it is suggested that an extended definition of PLPL and PVPL is 
developed taking into account the continuously varying A/C-satellite relative geometry.  In 
particular, when the current A/C manoeuvre will lead to less than 4 satellites in view or 
unacceptable accuracy degradations, the CIF shall be generated.  Following our discussion, 
the additional integrity flags criteria adopted for GLS in the presence of LAAS are the 
following: 
 When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds the VAL, the CIF shall be generated. 
 When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be 
generated. 
 
3.2. Radio Frequency Link Errors.  Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-
Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range error.  In a GPS receiver having three correlators 
(early, prompt and late), the phase of a correlator is given by (Mubarak and Dempster, 2009). 
 
                                                                    ( )     
  (
  
  
) (11) 
 
where the subscript C can refer to early (E), prompt (P) and late (L) respectively.  The prompt 
phase is always kept close to zero by the carrier tracking loop.  Early and late correlators are 
then placed on each side of the prompt, which means one of the phase of the correlator is 
positive and the other is negative. So, the phase difference between the two is increased in the 
presence of multipath.  ELP is simply the phase difference between the early and late 
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correlator outputs, where the phase of a correlator output is equal to the inverse tangent of the 
Q channel output divided by the I channel output.  Mathematically, the ELP is calculated by 
(Mubarak and Dempster, 2009): 
 
E  ( )       [
  ( )
  ( )
 
  ( )
  ( )
] 
(12) 
 
The probability of multipath detection is approximately 80% by setting the ELP threshold at 
0.1 radians (Fig. 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Probability of detecting multipath for varying ELP thresholds.  The symbol  indicates the radio                                        
of multipath to direct signal amplitude (i.e.,  = Am/Ad).  Adapted from (Mubarak and Dempster, 2010). 
 
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 5, with an ELP threshold of 0.1 radians, the Probability of 
False Alarm (PFA) is 0.3 when      is 42 dB/Hz.  This is an acceptable compromise for the 
ABIA caution flag implementation.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  PFA for varying ELP threshold. Adapted from (Mubarak and Dempster, 2010). 
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 Multipath range error experimental results are also used to trigger the warning integrity 
flag associated to multipath.  As discussed in (Sabatini et al., 2012), the effect of ground-echo 
signals translate into a sudden increase of the multipath ranging error of up to two orders of 
magnitude with respect to the airframe multipath errors alone.  However, the region of 
potential ground-echo multipath for the L1 frequency only extends up to 448.5 metres AGL 
(theoretical value applicable to all A/C types).  As a result of our analysis, the multipath 
integrity flags criteria are the following: 
  When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution integrity flag shall be generated. 
 When the multipath ranging error shows a sudden increase with the A/C flying in 
proximity of the ground (below 448.5 metres), the warning integrity flag shall be 
generated. 
 Based on results of the GPS-TSPI flight test activities (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008), an 
additional (practical) criteria was developed for the TORNADO-IDS A/C.  During 
TORNADO-IDS flight trials it was observed that flying above 500 ft AGL (even with 
pitch/bank angles exceeding 45 degrees), the ground-echo multipath was not a factor and the 
multipath range error (due to the airframe only) never exceeded 2 metres.  Consequently, the 
additional criteria applicable to the TORNADO-IDS A/C is:   
 When the multipath ranging error exceeds 2 metres and the A/C flies in proximity of 
the ground (below 500 ft AGL), the warning integrity flag shall be generated. 
 As discussed in (Sabatini et al., 2012), avionics GNSS receivers are resistant to dynamic 
stress errors.  A robust avionics GNSS receiver design typically employs an FLL as a backup 
to the PLL during initial loop closure and during high-dynamic stress with loss of phase lock, 
but will revert to pure PLL for the steady-state low to moderate dynamics in order to produce 
the highest carrier Doppler phase measurements.  However, flight test activities performed 
with avionics GPS receivers showed that the reacquisition time after loss of one or more 
satellite signals could be up to 40 seconds, depending on flight conditions and satellite 
constellations (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008).   
  
 Additionally, the analysis of receiver data recorded during several flights and up to speed 
of 500 kts highlighted that the Doppler effect causes a frequency shift, with respect to the L1 
carrier frequency, reaching a maximum value of about 15 KHz (Sabatini and Palmerini, 
2008). This value is relatively low if compared with the GPS frequency bandwidth (i.e., about 
30 MHz), and the high dynamic characteristics of the carrier tracking loops internal to the 
avionics receiver guarantee that neither the data accuracy is degraded nor the carrier phase is 
lost because of Doppler shift.  Nevertheless, the coupling between such frequency shift and 
the signal reacquisition strategy of the receiver can significantly affects the time necessary to 
get data after a signal loss.   
 
 Fig. 7 shows the fitting functions and associated curves relative to the acquisition time 
experimental data presented in (Sabatini et al., 2012).  These functions were conveniently 
used to estimate GNSS acquisition time based on satellite-A/C relative velocity (LOS).  With 
reference to Fig. 7, it is evident that for C/N0 below 28 dB-Hz the acquisition time exceeds 1 
sec even in low dynamics conditions.  Therefore, in these conditions, the required acquisition 
times might become unacceptable in case of satellite signal losses during certain mission- and 
safety-critical GNSS applications (military weapon aiming, missile guidance, precision 
approach, etc.).   
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Figure 16.  Doppler shift and signal acquisition in avionics GPS receivers. 
 
Consequently, the following criteria were defined for the Doppler integrity flags thresholds: 
  When the C/N0 is below 28 dB-Hz and the signal is lost, the caution integrity flag 
shall be generated if the estimated acquisition time is less than the application-
specific TTA requirements. 
 When the C/N0 is below 28 dB-Hz and the signal is lost, the warning integrity flag 
shall be generated if the estimated acquisition time exceeds the application-specific 
TTA requirements. 
 
3.3. Receiver Tracking Errors.  As discussed before, in order to define additional robust 
criteria for the ABIA integrity thresholds associated with dynamic stress errors, signal fading 
(C/N0 reduction) and interferences (J/S increase), a dedicated analysis of the GNSS receiver 
tracking performance was required.  When the GNSS code and/or carrier tracking errors 
exceed certain thresholds, the receiver loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and 
carrier tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold regions, only Monte Carlo 
simulations of the GNSS receiver in different dynamics and SNR conditions can determine 
the receiver tracking performance (Ward, 1997).  Nevertheless, some conservative rule-of-
thumbs approximating the measurement errors of the GNSS tracking loops were used for the 
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ABIA initial design.  Numerous sources of measurement errors affect the Carrier Tracking 
Loops and Code Tracking Loops.  However, for our purposes, it was sufficient to analyze the 
dominant error sources in each type of tracking loop.  Considering a typical avionics GNSS 
receiver employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator, the  Phase Lock Loop (PLL) 
threshold is given by [4, 13]: 
 
               
  (13) 
 
where: 
   = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except dynamic stress error; 
   = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop. 
 
Expanding Eq. (13), the 1-sigma threshold for the PLL tracking loop becomes (Kaplan and 
Hegarty, 2006): 
 
     √     
        
  
  
 
     
(14) 
 
where: 
       = 1-sigma thermal noise; 
   = vibration-induced oscillator phase noise; 
    = Allan variance–induced oscillator jitter. 
 
The PLL thermal noise is often thought to be the only carrier tracking error, since the other 
sources of PLL jitter may be either transient or negligible. The PLL thermal noise jitter is 
computed as follows: 
 
σ     
   
  
√
  
    
(  
 
       
)     (       ) 
 
(15) 
 
where: 
    = carrier loop noise bandwidth (Hz); 
      = carrier to noise power ratio (       
(    )    for      expressed in dB-Hz); 
T  =  predetection integration time (seconds); 
 
   and      can be derived from the SNR model described before.  Determination of the 
vibration-induced oscillator phase noise is a complex analysis problem.  In some cases, the 
expected vibration environment is so severe that the reference oscillator must be mounted 
using vibration isolators in order for the GPS receiver to successfully operate in PLL.  The 
equation for vibration induced oscillator jitter is: 
 
   
     
  
√ ∫    (  )
 (  )
   
   
    
    
     (       ) 
 
(16) 
 
where: 
    =  L-band frequency (Hz); 
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  (  )   = oscillator vibration sensitivity of       per g as a function of fm; 
    =  random vibration modulation frequency  (Hz); 
 (  )  = power curve of the random vibration as a function of    ( 
    ); 
g  = gravity acceleration.  
 
Usually the oscillator vibration sensitivity,   (  ) is not variable over the range of the 
random vibration modulation frequency, then Eq. (16) can be simplified to:  
 
   
       
  
√ ∫
 (  )
   
   
    
    
     (       ) 
 
 
(17) 
 
The equations used to determine Allan deviation phase noise are empirical. They are stated in 
terms of what the requirements are for the short-term stability of the reference oscillator as 
determined by the Allan variance method of stability measurement.  The equation for second-
order loop short-term Allan deviation is: 
 
       
  ( )    
  
      (   ) 
(18) 
 
The equation for third–order loop short-term Allan deviation for  PLL is: 
 
       
  ( )    
  
      (   ) 
(19) 
where: 
  ( ) =  Allan deviation-induced jitter (degrees); 
   =  L-band input frequency (Hz); 
   =  short-term stability gate time for Allan variance measurement (seconds); 
   =  noise bandwidth. 
 
Usually   ( ) can be determined for the oscillator and it changes very little with gate time  . 
In our research, the loop filter is assumed as a third-order with a noise bandwidth    = 18 Hz 
and the gate time            .  The Allan deviation is specified to be   ( )    
   .  
The dynamic stress error depends on the loop bandwidth and order. In a third-order loop, the 
dynamic stress error is [4, 13]: 
 
    
       
  
  
       
(
  
      )
        
   
   
  
      (       ) 
 
 
(20) 
 
where: 
  =  LOS range to the satellite; 
        =  maximum LOS acceleration dynamics (°   ); 
   =  loop filter natural radian frequency; 
   =  noise bandwidth. 
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For the L1 frequency we have:         (     )  (          )  (        
            )             .  Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic stress 
error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver Frequency Lock Loop (FLL).  The receiver 
tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency 
pull-in range of the FLL discriminator. Therefore, the FLL tracking threshold is [4, 13]: 
 
                          (  ) (21) 
 
where: 
3       =  3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter; 
    =  dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop. 
 
Eq. (21) shows that the dynamic stress frequency error is a 3-sigma effect and is additive to 
the thermal noise frequency jitter.  The reference oscillator vibration and Allan deviation–
induced frequency jitter are small-order effects on the FLL and are considered negligible. The 
1-sigma frequency jitter threshold is 1/(12T) = 0.0833/T Hz.  The FLL tracking loop jitter 
due to thermal noise is: 
 
      
 
   
√
    
    
[  
 
     
]      (  ) (22) 
 
where F is 1 at high      and 2 near the threshold.        is independent of C/A or P(Y) code 
modulation and loop order.  Since the FLL tracking loop involves one more integrator that 
the PLL tracking loop of the same order [4, 12], the dynamic stress error is: 
 
   
 
  
(
 
     
 
   
   
)  
 
     
 
     
     
     (  ) 
(23) 
 
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-of-thumb for the Delay Lock Loop 
(DLL) tracking threshold is that the 3-sigma value of the jitter due to all sources of loop 
stress must not exceed the correlator spacing (d), expressed in chips.  Therefore [4, 13]: 
  
                   (     ) (24) 
  
where: 
      = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter; 
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL tracking loop. 
  
The DLL thermal noise code tracking jitter is given by: 
 
      √
       
    
[ (   )  
    
     
]      (  ) 
(
(25) 
  
where: 
   = DLL discriminator correlator factor (1 for time shared tau-dithered early/late 
correlator and 0.5 for dedicated early and late correlators); 
d = Correlator spacing between early, prompt and late;  
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Bn = Code loop noise bandwidth; 
F2 = DLL dicriminator type factor (1 for early/late type discriminator and 0.5 for dot 
product type discriminator). 
 
The DLL tracking loop dynamic stress error is given by: 
 
   
   
   
  
       (     ) 
(
(26) 
 
where    /     is expressed in chips/secn.   
 
The PLL, FLL and DLL error equations described above allow to determine the      
corresponding to the tracking threshold of the receiver.  A generic criteria applicable to the 
ABIA system is:    
 
               (    )             [(    )    (    )    (    )   ]                           (27) 
 
where: 
(    )   = Minimum carrier-to-noise ratio for PLL carrier tracking; 
(    )   = Minimum carrier-to-noise ratio for FLL carrier tracking; 
(    )   = Minimum carrier-to-noise ratio for DLL code tracking. 
 
 Numerical solutions of Eqs. (13), (21) and (24) show that the weak link in unaided 
avionics GNSS receivers is the PLL due to its greater sensitivity to dynamics stress.  
Therefore, the (    )    threshold can be adopted in these cases.  In general, when the PLL 
loop order is made higher, there is an improvement in dynamic stress performance.  This is 
why third order PLL are widely adopted in avionics GNSS receivers (e.g., TORNADO-IDS).  
Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec predetection integration time 
(typical values for avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb tracking threshold for the PLL gives 
25 to 28 dB-Hz.  Additionally, in aided avionics receiver applications, the PLL tracking 
threshold can be significantly reduced by using external velocity aiding in the carrier tracking 
loop.  With this provision, a tracking threshold of approximately 15 to 18 dB-Hz can be 
achieved.  Using these theoretical and experimental threshold values, we can also calculate 
the receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the various cases of practical interest, 
as described in (Sabatini et al., 2012).  When available, flight test data collected in 
representative portions of the A/C operational flight envelope (or the results of Monte Carlo 
simulation) shall be used.  Taking an additional 5% margin on the 3-sigma tracking 
thresholds for the CIF, the following additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA integrity 
thresholds: 
 When                
                                        the 
CIF shall be generated. 
 When         
 or            or         the WIF shall be generated. 
  Additionally, taking a 1 dB margin on the maximum J/S performance of the receiver to 
generate the CIF, the following criteria were adopted for the CIF and WIF flags associated to 
interference: 
 When the difference between the received (incident) jammer power (dBw) and the 
received (incident) signal power (dBw) is 1 dB below the J/S performance of the 
receiver at its tracking threshold, the CIF shall be generated. 
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 When the difference between the received (incident) jammer power (dBw) and the 
received (incident) signal power (dBw) is above the J/S performance of the receiver at 
its tracking threshold, the WIF shall be generated. 
 During the GPS-TSPI flight test activities performed on TORNADO-IDS with unaided L1 
C/A code avionics receivers (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008), it was also found that, in all 
dynamics conditions explored, a      of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking of the 
satellites (Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008).  Consequently, taking the usual 1 dB margin for the 
CIF, the following additional criteria were adopted for the TORNADO-IDS C/N0 integrity 
flags: 
 When the      is less than 26 dB-Hz the CIF shall be generated.  
  When the      is less than 25 dB-Hz the WIF shall be generated.  
 
4. SIMULATION.  In order to validate the design of the ABIA IFG module, a detailed 
simulation case-study was performed on the TORNADO-IDS A/C, whose flight dynamics 
and GPS receiver performance characteristics were available from previous research 
(Sabatini and Palmerini, 2008).  Various geometric parameters were required to draw a 
detailed CATIA model of the A/C.  Some of the main parameters are listed in Table 3 
(Aircraft Drawings, 2012). 
 
Table 3.  TORNADO-IDS dimensions. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Length 16.72 m (54 ft 10 in) 
Wingspan 13.91 m at 25° wing sweep (45.6 ft)  
8.60 m at 67° wing sweep (28.2 ft) 
Height 5.95 m (19.5 ft) 
Wing area 26.6 m² (286 ft²) 
 
 
The TORNADO-IDS 3-D CATIA model obtained is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
25° wing sweep 
67° wing sweep 
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Figure 7.  TORNADO-IDS 3-D CATIA model. 
 
When calculating the antenna masking matrix and the corresponding satellite visibility, the 
antenna location must be included in the model.  Military A/C typically have an Upper 
Antenna (UA) at the top of the fuselage and a Lower Antenna (LA) at the base of the 
fuselage.  In our case, the upper antenna is assumed to be located 1.5 m behind the cockpit 
along the A/C centreline projection and 5 cm high on the A/C skin surface (Sabatini and 
Palmerini, 2008).  The lower antenna is right below the upper antenna on the opposite side of 
the fuselage (Fig. 8).  When calculating the satellite visibility, the line of sight (LOS) is 
measured in the antenna frame (i.e., origin at the antenna focal point).  The transformation 
from body-frame to antenna frame is obtained from: 
 
                    
         (m)       (31) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  TORNADO-IDS antennae locations. 
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The transformation matrixes for the upper and lower antennae are: 
 
     
     
 [
     
 
     
]  (m) 
(32) 
  
     
      [
     
 
    
] ( ) 
 (33) 
 
 
The simplified TORNADO-IDS antenna gain patter used in the simulation is shown in Fig. 9 
and it is mathematically described as follows: 
 
  (  )            E           (34) 
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Figure 9.  Simplified TORNADO-IDS antenna gain pattern. 
 
The simulated TORNADO-IDS A/C trajectory included the following phases: 
 Climb flight phase (0-5min); 
 Cruise flight phase (5-10min); 
 Turn and descend flight phase (10-5min); 
 Cruise flight phase (15-20min); 
 Approach flight phase (20-25min). 
In this simulation, the cruise phases correspond to straight-and-level flight segments and the 
approach phase is simulated as a straight descent employing GLS in the presence of LAAS.  
The terrain profile was assumed to be flat and free from man-made features.  No jamming 
sources were considered in this simulation.  The initial point of the A/C trajectory was 
located at London Heathrow airport (WGS coordinates: 51° 28′ 39″ N, 0° 27′ 41″ W) and the 
GPS constellation available on 24th December 2011 (12:00 a.m.) was simulated using the 
YUMA almanac data.  Additionally, for the TORNADO-IDS GPS receiver characteristics, 
we considered the random vibration power curve to be flat from 20Hz to 2000Hz with an 
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amplitude of 0.005      and the oscillator vibration sensitivity    (  )      
   parts/g.  
Finally, the third-order loop noise bandwidth is 18Hz and the maximum LOS jerk dynamic 
stress is 10g/s=98    .  The CIFs and WIFs relative to antenna masking, geometric accuracy 
degradations, S/N, multipath and Doppler shift were generated.  The overall results are shown 
in the Tables 4. 
 
Table 4.  GPS Integrity Flags for TORNADO-IDS. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the details of the specific CIFs and WIFs generated during the various 
TORNADO-IDS flight phases.  There was only one case (flight slice 600-608s) where the 
CIF was generated not being followed by the WIF (this was due to a temporary adverse 
relative geometry during the TDP manoeuvres).  In all other cases, the CIF was followed by 
the WIF.  It was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at least 2 seconds before the 
successive WIF onset (up to 6 seconds during the straight descent phase).  These results 
contribute to corroborate the validity of the models developed for the CIF/WIF thresholds.  It 
was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at least 2 seconds before the successive 
WIF onset.  This evidence is particularly important for the ABIA system design.  In fact, it is 
evident that the availability of a usable CIF represents a significant progress in this research 
with the potential for both manned A/C and UAVs to recover from mission- and safety-
critical flight conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses.  Therefore, it is envisaged 
that a properly designed ABIA Flight Path Module (FPM) could take full advantage of this 
predictive behaviour, allowing an A/C or UAV to correct its flight trajectory/attitude in order 
to avoid the occurrence of the critical GNSS data losses.  Additionally, it is possible that this 
predictive behaviour be exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS based auto-land capability.     
 
Phase 1 2 3 4 5
Trajectory Climb Cruise Turning 
descent
Cruise Approach    
(LAAS 
assisted)
Duration 5min 5min 5min 5min 5min
Available 
satellites
16
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 31
16
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 31
16
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 31
16
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 31
16
PRN 1, 3, 6, 7, 
9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 
26, 27, 30, 31
CIF - - 600~608s 
672~ 698s
762~788s
852~878s
- 1484~1500s
WIF - - 674~692s
764~782s
854~872s
- 1490~1500s
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Table 5.  GPS Integrity Flags for TORNADO-IDS (CIF/WIF details). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK.  In this research the architecture of an ABIA 
system for GNSS applications was defined.  The detailed design of the ABIA IFG module 
was also accomplished.  This module can generate both CIFs and WIFs associated to antenna 
obscuration, geometric accuracy degradations, SNR, multipath and Doppler shift.  A detailed 
simulation case study was performed on the TORNADO-IDS A/C.  Relevant flight 
manoeuvres/phases were considered in this simulation, including climb, cruise, turning 
descent and straight descent.  From the results of this simulation activity, the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
 The ABIA Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) is capable of generating integrity flags to 
provide both caution and warning signals to the pilot when GNSS signals are 
degraded or lost. 
 After the integrity caution flag is generated, the time available for the pilot/autopilot 
to react (before the integrity warning flag is generated), is sufficient for safety-critical 
tasks including GLS curved/segmented precision approach and automatic landing 
applications. 
 In the limited range of dynamic conditions explored, data analysis showed that the 
ABIA system can provided useful integrity signals for CAT-III precision approach  
and automatic landing. 
Our current research is focussing on the following areas:   
Phase 1 2 3 4 5
Trajectory Climb Cruise Turning descent Cruise Approach   (LAAS 
assisted)
Duration 5min 5min 5min 5min 5min
Accuracy CIF - - - - 1484~1500s
Accuracy WIF - - - - 1490~1500s
Obscuration CIF 0~300s            
PRN 30 
300~600s 
PRN30
PRN 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 26
900~1200s
PRN 30
1200~1500s
PRN30
Obscuration WIF - - PRN 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 22, 23, 26
- 1210~1236s 
1254~1500s
PRN30
C/N0 CIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30
1200~1500s
PRN 1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 30
C/N0 WIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
0~50s 
PRN 9
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
1200~1500s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
Multipath CIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
1200~1500s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
Multipath WIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
1200~1500s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
Doppler CIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
1200~1500s
PRN 1,3,11,12,13,30
Doppler WIF 0~300s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
300~600s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
600~900s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
900~1200s
PRN 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 30
1200~1500s
PRN 1, 3, 11, 12, 13, 
30
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 Examine other types of manned A/C (e.g., civil airliners) and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs). 
 Multipath detection and isolation in various kinds of receivers for avionics 
applications. 
 Develop and test ABIA Flight Path Guidance (FPG) modules for manned A/C and 
UAVs.  
Additional long-term objectives of our research include: 
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS techniques to improve integrity levels in a wide 
spectrum of civil/military mission-critical and safety-critical GNSS applications. 
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS techniques to supplement current and likely future 
SBAS/GBAS technology for en-route, terminal, approach and surface operations. 
 Investigate and compare different types of avionics sensor technologies and their 
potential to support the design of a robust ABAS architecture. 
 Investigate the potential of ABAS techniques to support UAV Sense-and-Avoid (SAA). 
 Investigate the potential of ABAS techniques to enhance the performance of next 
generation Flight Management Systems (FMS) for Four-Dimensional Trajectory 
(4DT) Operations in the future Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment. 
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